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SUMMARY:
... In May 2004, the European Patent Office dealt a serious blow to gene patents by revoking Myriad Genetics's
controversial patent on the BRCA1 gene. ... The patent holder can choose to license the patented invention to others,
can choose to use the patented invention exclusively itself, or can choose to prevent any use of the patented invention by
itself or by others. In the gene patent area, the exclusive rights of the patent holder can raise the costs of genetic services,
diminish the quality of genetic tests and treatments, and interfere with access to health care. ... A patent holder might
forbid anyone from using the genetic sequence it has patented, even if the patent holder does not itself offer a diagnostic
test using that sequence. ... In one case, the court held that individuals who provided tissue and monetary support to
a researcher for the discovery of a particular disease gene could maintain a claim of unjust enrichment against both the
researcher and the hospital that patented the gene and charged a fee for use of the genetic sequence in testing. ... Under
this system, patent holders would have to grant licenses to researchers and physicians to use a patented genetic sequence
in return for a reasonable fee to the patent holder. ...
TEXT:
[*403]
In May 2004, the European Patent Office dealt a serious blow to gene patents by revoking Myriad Genetics's
controversial patent on the BRCA1 gene. n1 That patent covered any method of diagnosing a predisposition for breast or
ovarian cancer that used the BRCA1 gene sequence. n2 Elsewhere, gene patents are also being challenged in courtrooms,
n3 legislatures, n4 and in the arena of public opinion. Numerous international organizations, such as the Council of
Europe's Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights and UNESCO, view genes as belonging to the common heritage
of mankind. n5 Intense opposition to gene patents is also coming from [*404] researchers, n6 politicians, n7 organized
religions, n8 indigenous groups, n9 patient groups, n10 and medical professional organizations. n11 Patents covering
human genetic material raise a variety of issues related to legal appropriateness, scientific and medical research, and
access to health care, as well as issues regarding privacy, autonomy, religious freedom, and reproductive liberty. While
there are reasons to celebrate many new developments in medicine and bioethics, patents for human genetic material are
an example of a bad policy that needs to be corrected. Gene patents raise bioethical concerns because they can impede
access to appropriate health care and violate individual rights.
I. The Uncomfortable Fit Between Genes and Patents
Over two centuries ago, the framers of the U.S. Constitution realized that it was important to create incentives
for technological innovation. n12 In return for a patent, the inventor must show the invention satisfies a number of
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requirements, including a sufficient written description, as well as utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. n13 Yet not all
inventions are patentable. For example, products of nature are not patentable. n14
[*405] How is it then that genes are patentable? Applicants who seek human gene patents assert that they have
isolated and purified a gene or genetic material, thereby producing something new -- a product whose non--coding regions
have been eliminated, but which still performs the same function as a naturally--occurring gene. n15 While some courts
have held isolated and purified products of nature to be patentable, n16 the useful properties of a gene -- such as its ability
to bind to another complementary strand of DNA for diagnosis or its ability to code for a particular protein -- are not
ones that the scientist has invented, but rather are natural, inherent properties of genes themselves. n17 Often gene patent
holders lay claim to gene segments that actually occur in nature and exist within the bodies of human beings. n18 In fact,
one Australian company has acquired global patent protection over non--coding regions of the human genome, amassing
millions of dollars in licensing deals with drug companies and universities for the right to use this information in research
and drug development. n19
The patent system is generally designed to incentivize research and innovation, but there are many other incentives for
the discovery of [*406] genetic sequences. Molecular biologists were attempting to identify genes long before patents
were awarded for genetic material. When biologists began the Human Genome Project, they had no idea they would
be able to patent genes; n20 they had other reasons to search for genes, namely medical interests and the potential for
academic advancement and status. n21
The discovery of genes does not require the same commercial incentives as drug development. The development of
drugs is undertaken primarily with private funds (for which investors expect a commercial return), n22 while the discovery
of genes has been undertaken with vast quantities of public funds. For example, national governments and non--profit
institutions spent over $1.8 billion of taxpayers' money on genomics in 2000. n23 Myriad, the U.S. genetics company
that first patented BRCA1, used over five million dollars from a government agency when researching the patent n24
and utilized sequence data from public databases. Thus, if gene patents continue, the public will pay twice -- first for the
research and second for the high royalty costs that many patent holders require for subsequent use of their patented gene
in a product.
Unlike drug development, gene discovery does not require expensive clinical trials and approval from the Food and
Drug Administration. Testing for mutations in a disease gene can begin almost immediately after the gene has been
identified. n25 Thus, the need to provide financial compensation to a gene--discoverer through gene patent royalties is not
as great as the need to compensate the developer of a drug that must undergo costly clinical trials, especially since only a
small number of drugs actually become commercially--viable products.
Moreover, there are fewer drawbacks to granting a patent on a drug or a medical device than granting a patent on
a gene. For instance, other [*407] researchers can create alternatives to drugs and devices. In contrast, there are no
alternatives to use of the patented human genes for genetic diagnosis and gene therapy. n26
II. Gene Patents Create Problems for Access to Appropriate Health Care
Under patent law, the patent holder has the right, for twenty years from the date of the application filing, to prevent any
other individual or institution from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the invention. n27 The patent holder can
choose to license the patented invention to others, can choose to use the patented invention exclusively itself, or can
choose to prevent any use of the patented invention by itself or by others. In the gene patent area, the exclusive rights of
the patent holder can raise the costs of genetic services, diminish the quality of genetic tests and treatments, and interfere
with access to health care.
In some cases, gene patent holders will only let their own laboratories use the test for the patented gene. Exclusive
licensing of a gene patent can itself interfere with the development of diagnostics. Various mutations in the same gene
can cause a particular disease, but companies that do not let anyone else test for "their" gene make it more difficult for the
discovery of other significant mutations in that gene. In countries where the Alzheimer's gene and hemochromatosis gene
were not patented, researchers were able to discover previously unknown mutations. n28 These additional mutations are
often critical tools for diagnosing individuals who would not otherwise be diagnosed by the patented gene or diagnostic
test.
The possibility of inappropriate diagnostics was part of the concern that prompted the French challenge to the Myriad
patent. n29 Myriad forbid French doctors from undertaking BRCA1 testing and required the tests to be sent to Myriad's
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lab. n30 But the sequencing technique by Myriad Genetics fails to detect ten to twenty percent of expected mutations
in BRCA1. n31 [*408] Thus, gene patenting runs the risk of directly harming a patient by failing to make available
a medical diagnostic procedure that can detect a disease in her genetic make--up. Recent NIH--proposed guidelines
recommend wide licensing of patented inventions to nonprofit researchers and public health agencies in order to remedy
this problem, stressing that exclusive licensing agreements have ""detrimental short--term and long--term effects on both
the quantity and quality of health care.'" n32
A gene patent allows its holder to charge whatever price it wants. For example, prior to the patent opposition mentioned
above, Myriad required that all BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostic testing be performed by their Utah laboratory at a cost of
$2,975 per test, n33 three times the amount French laboratories charged. n34
Gene patents can interfere with clinical adoption of genetic tests, potentially compromising the quality of testing
by limiting the development of higher quality and lower--cost alternative testing methods. n35 A survey of seventy--two
genetic--testing laboratories found that twenty--five percent of the laboratories have been deterred from offering a test due
to the enforcement of a patent or license. n36 For example, beginning in 1998, SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories
sent letters to labs ordering them to stop performing or developing tests for the hemochromatosis (HFE) gene. n37 The
patent holder asked for an up--front fee of $25,000 from academic laboratories and as much as $250,000 from commercial
laboratories, plus a fee of twenty dollars per test. n38 As a result, thirty percent of labs that received the letter discontinued
testing or ceased development of HFE testing services. n39
A patent holder might forbid anyone from using the genetic sequence it has patented, even if the patent holder does
not itself offer a diagnostic [*409] test using that sequence. n40 This practice could become more prevalent as more
pharmacogenomic discoveries are made and inventors sit on their patent rights, prohibiting patients from receiving testing
for genetic disease and interfering with the doctor--patient relationship. Most drugs only work on a certain percentage of
patients who use them. n41 Genetic testing can help distinguish those patients for whom a drug will work from those for
whom it will not. But such tests will also limit the market for drugs. For example, one pharmaceutical company has filed
for a patent on a genetic test to determine the effectiveness of its asthma drug, yet does not plan to develop the test or let
anyone else develop it. n42 Patent law in Europe, unlike in the United States, provides protections against such actions
by requiring that the inventor actually "work" (i.e., use or develop) the invention; if the inventor does not "work" the
invention, the inventor may be compelled to license the invention to another entity. n43
III. Some Gene Patents Violate Individual Rights
A. Informed Consent Issues
In many different settings in the United States over the past thirty years, blood, tissue, and other bodily fluid samples have
been collected from individuals and used in genetic research without the person's consent or knowledge. n44 If a lucrative
gene was found, it was patented. Once a gene is identified and patented, its availability is often severely restricted, even
to the people who provided tissue samples and funding for the genetic research. n45 In one case, the court held that
individuals who provided tissue and monetary support to a researcher for the discovery of a particular disease gene could
maintain a claim of unjust enrichment against both the researcher and the hospital that patented the gene and charged a
fee for [*410] use of the genetic sequence in testing. n46 But the court also held that the tissue sources had no right
to be informed about the potential commercialization of their tissue before they provided tissue to the researcher. n47
This could lead to the anomalous situation where a person's tissue could be used for commercial purposes without her
knowledge or consent in ways that violate her personal or religious beliefs, and her only legal remedy would be monetary
compensation after the offending act took place.
This is not a trivial concern. Many religion denominations oppose gene patents. n48 Certain religious and ethnic
groups have concerns about the use of their tissue for research. In pending litigation, the Havasupai tribe of Arizona
is suing researchers for unauthorized use of their genetic samples. n49 The group consented to give blood samples to
a particular researcher for diabetes research. n50 They allege that without their consent, their samples were sent to
other researchers around the country for research, which they had not approved, including research that might lead to
discrimination against them as a group (such as schizophrenia research) and research that could contradict their religious
beliefs (such as research on the purported origins and migrations of the group). n51
In Europe, concern about informed consent of patients whose tissue is used in developing a gene patent is so important
that it is mentioned in European patent provisions. Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and Council of the
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European Union, created as a means to ensure uniformity in intellectual property rights as applied to biotechnological
inventions throughout the European Union, states that where "an invention is based on biological material of human origin
or if it uses such material ... the person from whose body the material is taken must have had an opportunity of expressing
free and informed consent thereto, in accordance with national law." n52 If such a policy were in force in [*411] the
United States, it would protect individuals whose blood samples were used without their consent in genetics research and
served as the basis for patent applications.
B. Reproductive Liberty Issues
Since a gene patent holder has the power to forbid all use of that specific gene or mutation for the lifetime of the patent,
the patent holder can limit its use entirely in certain situations, such as by forbidding prenatal diagnosis for that particular
gene. The company that holds patents on mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes has indicated that it will use its
control to forbid prenatal testing for breast cancer, perhaps due to the controversial potential for selective abortion. n53
However, such a stance interferes with a woman's reproductive liberty, a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. n54
Because the issuance of a patent is a state action, even when issued to a private party, it might be deemed to infringe on
reproductive rights where it limits the availability of genetic testing needed for a woman to make an informed decision.
In Lifchez v. Hartigan, a federal judge struck down an embryo research ban as unconstitutional because it interfered
with a woman's right to use innovative prenatal screening. n55 The judge said, "The cluster of constitutional choices that
includes the right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to submit to a procedure designed to
give information about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to abort." n56
IV. Toward a New Policy Horizon
There is growing interest in the U.S. Congress in dealing with the problems created by patents on genetic sequences.
n57 There are several potential policies that could be adopted. Genes could be declared [*412] unpatentable subject
matter. Another potential remedy is to allow doctors to perform diagnostic testing on patients without deeming the
procedures to be infringement of the relevant gene patent. For example, Congress enacted a statutory provision exempting
licensed medical physicians from infringement for use of a patented medical or surgical procedure. n58 Enacting a similar
amendment for gene patents would permit doctors and laboratories to use patented gene sequences in diagnostic tests
without having to pay a royalty or obtain a license. n59 Alternatively, the government could impose compulsory licensing
for all uses of gene patents. Under this system, patent holders would have to grant licenses to researchers and physicians
to use a patented genetic sequence in return for a reasonable fee to the patent holder. n60
Conclusion
Gene patents create problems for health care, medical research, and individual rights. While it might be appropriate
to award patent rights to a genetic diagnostic kit or a genetic therapy, it is not appropriate to award protection over an
isolated sequence or a clone of a gene. Prohibiting the patenting of genetic sequences is not inimical to patent law. Rather,
it would be permissible in the United States and around the world under the public health exceptions in the World Trade
Organization's TRIPS Agreement. n61 It is crucial for high quality health care and individual autonomy that the United
States reexamine its gene patent policy.

FOOTNOTES:
n1. Press Release, Eur. Patent Office, "Myriad/Breast Cancer" Patent Revoked After Public Hearing (May 18,
2004), http://www.european--patent--office.org/news/pressrel/2004 05 18 e.htm. This type of legal challenge is called
an "opposition" to a granted patent under European patent law and allows third parties to challenge a patent's validity
within nine months after it is granted. See European Patent Convention, art. 99 (1998), http://www.european-patent--office.org/legal/epc/. The revocation was made by the Opposition Division, a panel of three patent examiners
and one legal expert, applying current law as set forth in the European Patent Convention. Decision Revoking the
European Patent (Art. 102(1), (3) EPC) (Eur. Pat. Office May 17, 2004) (revoking European Patent No. 0699754)
[hereinafter Revocation Decision].
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